DIFFICULT TOPICS WRESTLE WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN MOROCCO Susan Slyomovics
What are the difficulties in presenting any event whose central content is individual pain and when any corroborating police or governmental documentation is denied or absent? Susan Slyomovics argues that funerals, eulogies, mock trials, vigils and sit-ins, public testimony and witnessing, storytelling and poetry recitals are performances of human rights and strategies for opening public space in Morocco.
The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco is a unique distillation of politics, anthropology, and performance studies, offering both a clear picture of the present state of human rights and a vision of a possible future for public protest and dissidence in Morocco. According to Ibrahim Hamidi, perhaps the most informed and incisive journalist in Syria today, "~The message that the Regional Baath Conference wanted to send at the end of the conference to public opinion, the opposition and foreign actors-especially America-is that the Baath Party will remain the ruling party in Syria."' Very little was said at the conference about foreign policy, beyond affirmation that peace will remain Syria's "strategic choice" and that the regime will work to enhance its bargaining position vis-a-vis Israel. Indicating the regime's domestic focus, Bashar emphasized that "any decisions or recommendations made during the conference should express our internal needs only, in isolation from any other considerations aimed at pushing us in directions that contradict our national interest or threaten our stability."2
Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights
The conference was not without positive developments, though these were hardly far-reaching reforms. Expanding space for political participation was a recurring theme. For the first time, there were serious recommendations that the state should review the Emergency Law in place since 1963, with an eye toward "narrowing the scope of state security matters."3 A new "political parties law" is likely to take effect soon,4 though Article 8 of the constitution, designating the Baath Party as the "leader of state and society," will remain untouched. Reiterating a stock line, a high-level official told the pan-Arab daily al-Hayat that modification of Article 8 is an "external request" made by non-Syrian interests. This statement is related to various proclamations during the conference regarding the need to "lay bare" the intentions of the expatriate opposition, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in exile in Paris, on the grounds that they are not true "nationalists" and are being supported by actors hostile to Syria.5 Another likely subject of this denunciation is the Reform Party of Syria led by Washington-area dentist Farid Ghadry, a would-be Syrian Ahmad Chalabi who is being promoted by the neo-conservative think tank, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.
In various interactions, formal and otherwise, Bashar emphasized that "the party does not own the state."'6 It is necessary, he said, "to redefine the relationship of the party to political power, and not to be enmeshed in daily politics, and to move away from office work and focus on interacting with the masses."7 Henceforth, the Baath's share of cabinet posts will be limited to ten.8 Nonetheless, it was stipulated toward the end of the conference that the prime minister and the speaker of parliament must be members of the Baath's ruling body, the Regional Command, creating an obvious contradiction For the regime, the new team is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, its unquestioning loyalty will make for a less erratic policy. On the other hand, the new Command leadership lacks vision and, many say, competence. It remains to be seen which edge of the sword will strike. If the new team is a short-term fix to rid the leadership of troublemakers, then it could enable a smoother and surer decision-making process in the future. However, if the desired end is to surround the leadership with complacent figures in perpetuity, then it is probable that Syria will return to square one, with the leadership approaching a stifling absolutism of sorts. In any event, Syria's principal dilemma leaves little room for the long-term sustainability of such a formula.
Institutionally speaking, Bashar and his closest allies have played a delicate game to consolidate their control. On the one hand, they needed to preserve the structure of executive authority by strengthening the party and government institutions; on the other hand, they had to manipulate the same authority structure and institutions that would allow them to limit the personal power of potential adversaries in the long run. This was not a choice of one strategy among many on offer: Bashar needed, and needs, the Baath Party. Since he lacks his father's charisma, and with the multiplication of power centers around certain personalities within the regime, selective reinvigoration of the roles of the party was the only rational choice.
Another change is increasing reliance on the security services, as indicated by the shifting membership in the Regional Command. Historically, the Command included the chief of staff and the defense minister. After the June conference, two members of the security services took the spots of these officials in the Command. It is unmistakable that the security services are continuing to gain authority in circles that they began to infiltrate in the early 197os. Finally, the institutional clout has been eroded, particularly after the pullout from Lebanon.
The Balance Sheet
The Digging a little deeper, one finds that the decisive break was made not only with the old guard, but with the regime of Hafiz al-Asad, a development that cannot be translated publicly into words in Syria's political climate today. Bashar was indeed his father's choice of successor, following the death of his oldest son Basil in a 1994 car crash, but it is questionable whether Asad senior wanted Bashar to change the regime itself. This is not an academic point, for with the changes to the regime came changes in the regime's style and approach whose contours are still emerging.
In its handling of the US invasion of Iraq and the aftermath, the "Lebanon file" after the May 2000 Israeli withdrawal and the US "war on terror" that linked Syria with "terrorist" groups within Syria and in Lebanon, the current Syrian regime has contributed to its own isolation. This isolation is exacerbated by the Bush administration's hostile posture. Hafiz al-Asad's regime boxed itself in domestically, but was always able to compensate for problems caused by its centralization of domestic political power by adopting an uncompromising stance on regional issues-particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict. Bashar's regime has been steadily losing this ability. In the past, Palestinian and Lebanese resistance movements were used from a distance to prop up the legitimacy of the Syrian regime. Today, the regime has absorbed these tools as part and parcel of its legitimacy, thereby compromising its independence 
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sight. Asad senior was likely, however, to have delayed the inevitable a little longer. The breathing space that the regime afforded itself by clearing the way for a less conflict-ridden decision-making process is an opportunity to embark on irreversible domestic decentralization that would herald an era of putting development ahead of both regime security and external demands. Independent, opposition and regime-friendly observers in Syria will not bet on this scenario. In view of the Bush administration's aggressive policy orientation, the smart money is on a strategy of gradual submission to external demands that may hurt the wellbeing of the Syrian people, but will keep the regime's security intact. The same scenarios unfold in the case of the country's political economy.
State of the Economy
The state of the Syrian economy remains dismal. It is unclear whether the deliberations at the recent Baath Regional Command Conference reflect the sophistication that is required to deal with the crisis.14 Optimists continue to debate whether this or that liberalization measure is likely to improve the economy as though the missing link is a "good plan at only 34 percent, after years of supposed support and promotion of private sector growth.27 Obstacles to privatesector growth remain both political and structural, having to do with the political role that the public sector plays in servicing the regime's economic power and social legitimacy. Another part of the problem has been the failure of existing public and new private banks in financing the growth of the private sector.28 As a result, new entrants into the private sector remain few. By contrast, the already existing private businessmen and the public-private networks to which they belong are expanding at a steady pace as they are faced with little or no competition from potential entrants who lack financing. These big business groups worry not about liberalization or lack thereof at this point; they are mostly concerned to keep the formula within which they are accustomed to work. One might have to wait for a vigorous economy until these individuals and networks discover a contradiction between further capital accumulation and the existing formula. For the time being, the idea that a partnership agreement with the EU can provide the cure for Syria's economic ills is incommensurate with the political and institutional requirements of such an agreement. For better or for worse, and unless Baathist infighting resurfaces, the Syrian regime is left to its own devices on the domestic front as it attempts to resolve its curious dilemma. The official line is that Syria is prevented from taking certain reform measures because they correspond to external demands. This is a false binary opposition. It is true that Syria is facing a hostile international environment and an unprincipled political campaign against it, but that has been the case since the early twentieth century. The hostility is unlikely to subside, whatever the stance of the United States. Proper development for state and society in Syria does not conflict with warding off external enemies. On the contrary, it is the most efficient weapon against them.
Moment of Decision
Proper development does conflict with the guaranteed security of the Syrian regime as it stands today. The Syrian regime is quickly approaching the point where it will have to choose between compromising with the outside forces it cautions against, thereby preserving itself in its current form, or compromising with the Syrian people, thereby voluntarily reducing its own power. Much antiZionist and anti-imperialist rhetoric notwithstanding, this choice is not in the end such a big puzzle. 
